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Introduction 
Nations have often found it difficult to come to terms with atrocities committed in the past. The 
same is true of how the Vichy regime that collaborated with Nazi Germany treated Jews during World 
War Two. During the course of the war, the French gave 230,000 people residing in France to Germany, 
and only 32,000 returned.1 In the post-war period, however, the French believed in the Gaullist myth 
that all of France resisted these collaborative measures. The Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup, where almost 13,000 
men, women, and children were arrested, interned, and deported to Auschwitz by French officials 
became a key event that changed public opinion and has since become a rallying cry for France to 
recognize what the Vichy government did. France’s reaction to these events poses the questions: what 
made people collaborate, resist, or simply allow the roundups and deportations to occur? What are the 
unintended consequences of our actions, or inactions, in the grand scheme of things?  
The central argument of this essay is that the events of the July 1942 Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup provide 
an example of how the French collaborated, resisted, and passively allowed the mass arrest and 
deportation of Jewish families. The Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup showed that French collaboration with Germany 
went above and beyond what the Germans demanded, that the traditional definition of active 
resistance can be broadened, and ultimately how apathy and simply “following orders” led to 
catastrophic events. Finally, this event falls prey to the Gaullist myth of widespread resistance prevalent 
in public memory, and demonstrates a reluctance to face the crimes France committed.  The following 
historiography, while not conclusive, traces some of the most important works on Vichy and the Jews in 
France. Each of the sources have their own biases, but have formed the way academia and the public 
have viewed Vichy and the Jews, in a way, representing the changing public opinions throughout history.  
In the post-war period, the prevailing thought in France was Gaullist in theory, praising the 
                                                          
1 Claude Levy and Paul Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, trans. Inea Bushnaq (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1969), 211.  
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whole nation of resisters with few collaborators. Joan Wolf argued in her 2004 book Harnessing the 
Holocaust that de Gaulle purposefully suppressed the extent of collaboration to unite a divided France.2  
However, starting in the late ‘60s with Patrick Modiano’s novels and Marcel Ophüls’ 1969 documentary 
The Sorrow and the Pity, focus shifted to an emphasis on often enthusiastic collaboration from all levels 
of society.3 Henry Rousso’s The Vichy Syndrome, published in 1969 during the Klaus Barbie trial, forced 
the French and the world to reexamine France’s collaborationist role in the Holocaust.4 Robert Paxton 
and Michael Marrus’s book, Vichy France and the Jews (1983) gave credence to this viewpoint and 
argued that Vichy went above and beyond what the Nazis required and that most of the French 
population was collaborating with Germany by default if they were not actively resisting.5  
 This argument that most people collaborated with the Germans, either actively or passively, has 
been challenged by some scholars in the past twenty years, including Susan Zuccotti in The Holocaust, 
the French, and the Jews, and John Sweets in Choices in Vichy France. Zuccotti argued that widespread 
apathy enabled about three quarters of French Jews and about half of foreign Jews in France to survive, 
in spite of Vichy’s collaboration (there were about 330,000 Jews in France at the end of 1950, and about 
135,000 of those were foreign Jews). 6 She claimed that many French aided Jews (especially children) 
either actively by helping them escape or hide or passively by not informing on them. Additionally, 
Sweets called for a redefinition of collaborators, saying that unlike Paxton and Marrus, only those who 
were actively working with Vichy or Germany were collaborators, but that those who were passive, with 
an attentisme (wait-and-see) attitude cannot be de facto lumped with collaborators. 7   
                                                          
2 Joan B. Wolf, Harnessing the Holocaust: The Politics of Memory in France (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 187. 
3 The Sorrow and the Pity , directed by Marcel Ophuls (Columbia Pictures Home Video, 1969) 
documentary. 
4 William VanderWolk, Rewriting the Past Memory, History and Narration in the Novels of Patrick 
Modiano,(Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 1997), 125. 
5 Robert Paxton and Michael Marrus, Vichy France and the Jews (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), xii-xiii. 
6 Susan Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, (New York: BasicBooks, 1993), 3-5.  
7 John Sweet, Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 83, 168-169. 
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Despite the wide availability on many subtopics of Holocaust history, there are some that are 
sparse and hard to locate. There is a lack of specifically English sources on the Vel’ d’Hiv and other 
roundups and deportations in France. Claude Levy and Paul Tillard’s book Betrayal at the Vel d’Hiv is one 
of only a few English monographs on the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup. This book was instrumental for learning 
about the events of the roundup and used hundreds of excerpts from testimonies and official 
documents to uncover what actually happened.8 Most of the primary sources I used came from work by 
Levy and Tillard and Susan Zuccotti.9 Part of the reason there are so few sources on this topic is due to 
the fact that is it an event that much of France would rather forget, because of its collaborationist 
nature, but also because few of those arrested survived. In addition to a lack of extensive sources on the 
Vel’ d’Hiv, there is also a discrepancy between the amount of memoirs and primary sources from those 
who participated in the resistance and those who actively or passively collaborated with Vichy and 
Germany.   
 Public memory of the Holocaust in France can in part be seen through the above mentioned 
histories, but separate studies on how the French remember their involvement with these events reveal 
a desire to not address the problem or discus it.  W. James Booth argued that when people discuss Vichy 
and French involvement in World War Two, they separate the current French government from Vichy to 
avoid blaming oneself for their actions.10 Additionally, Susan Suleiman in Crisis of Memory and the 
Second World War claimed that people forget what they do not want to remember or associate 
themselves with.11 The prevailing idea in these sources is that France has struggled to come to terms 
with Vichy’s and their own involvement in the Holocaust, which the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup became a 
                                                          
8 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv. 
9 See bibliography. Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv; Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the 
Jews. 
10 W. James Booth, “Communities of Memory: On Identity, Memory, and Debt,” The American Political 
Science Review 93, no. 2 (1999): 250.  
11 Susan Suleiman, Crisis of Memory and the Second World War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006).  
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symbol of, because of a national sense of guilt for either collaborating or simply allowing it to happen.  
The scholars noted above and others have conflicting definitions on what it means to 
collaborate and to resist. This paper defines collaborators as those who actively worked with the 
German government or went a step further to make France more fascist and anti-Semitic. Resisters are 
defined as those who actively worked against Vichy and Germany militarily to stop the advancement of 
German troops, by actively spreading news in clandestine newspapers, or aiding Jews and other outcasts 
escape or hide. However, these two definitions overlook a large part of the population who remained 
apathetic, did nothing, and had an attentisme attitude. This group of people had varying degrees of 
respect for and agreement with Vichy and its policies, but were united in spite of their feelings for 
choosing to not act. Oftentimes the indifferent are lumped in with the collaborators, reminiscent of the 
“if you are not with us then you are against us” idea, however, it is beneficial to discuss these as three 
separate groups in order to have a clearer idea as to how people reacted to Vichy and to the Jews they 
knew or encountered.  
Background 
 In the inter-war period, thousands of Jews fled to countries that included France, England, and 
America from Germany and other Eastern European nations.12 During this time and the rise of Hitler, 
France was preoccupied with its own economic depression and had a false sense of security about the 
ability of Germany to invade. The post-World War One economic stagnation and Great Depression 
caused unemployment to skyrocket in France and caused migration from moderate political parties to 
more extreme ones, such as the Communist or fascist parties (the Action Française).13 In addition to 
being distracted by internal economic and social problems, the French also thought they were safe from 
Hitler’s expansion because of their Maginot Line. The French military dug a huge defensive line on the 
                                                          
12 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 47. 
13 Eugene Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 47.  
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East of France to prevent an attack, championed as one of the best defensive measures. This gave the 
French a false sense of security and a reason to deny that there was a problem in Germany, leaving 
them unprepared to deal with the impending attack.14 
In her memoir, Vivette Samuel, who worked for the Œuvre de secours aux enfants (OSE, or 
Society for Assistance to Children) recounted that her father was still confident that France was not 
going to be threatened by Germany even when Austria was annexed in March 1938, but that many 
people were worried for war that summer. She said when the Munich Pact was signed everyone was 
relieved and people were more worried about Spain and the fascist revolution going on just South of the 
French border than they were Germany. 15 However, when Germany attacked in 1940 and took a mere 
four weeks to reach Paris, the French and the world were shocked.  
As soon as France fell, Marshal Petain, an 80 year old World War One veteran and a member of 
Action Française, sent negotiators to Hitler to set up a collaborative government between France and 
Germany, known as the Vichy regime.  Historian Stanley Hoffmann argued that Vichy was established 
out of political necessity and can be considered “involuntary collaboration” essential “to safeguard 
French interests in interstate relations between the beaten power and the victor.”16 However, in 
addition to this “involuntary collaboration,” some voluntarily collaborated with the Nazis because they 
agreed with their racial and fascist beliefs.17 No matter the varied and arguable causes for Vichy’s 
establishment, “the Vichy regime wanted to solve in its own way what it saw as a ‘Jewish problem’ in 
France,” based on Frances long history of anti-Semitism, according to Marrus and Paxton.18  However, it 
is important to note that unlike Hitler, “Vichy’s measures were not intended to kill,” but instead to 
                                                          
14 Weber, The Hollow Years, 175.  
15 Vivette Samuel, Rescuing the Children: A Holocaust Memoir (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2002), 10. 
16 Stanley Hoffmann, “Collaborationism in France during World War II,” The Journal of Modern History 40, 
no. 3 (1968): 376.  
17 Hoffmann, “Collaborationism in France,” 376.  
18 Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), xii 
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assimilate Jews who had been living in France for a while and emigrate those who were more recent 
arrivals, in order to have few Jews in France when the Germans began deporting Jews from Western 
Europe to death camps in the East.19 
 Since August 1940, Vichy implemented varied anti-Semitic legislation progressively removing 
Jews from normal society. The Statut des juifs excluded Jews from advanced positions with public or 
governmental influence and other economic limitations, and later Jews’ identity papers in the Occupied 
Zone had to be stamped with Juif. Even though public opinion for years held that this was done on 
orders from Germany, there were no German orders until after these French laws were already 
instated.20 Referring to these laws, Samuel recollected, “French Jews could not understand how a 
legitimate government headed by Marshal Petain could take such measures against World War I 
veterans, citizens integrated into the French community – ‘assimilated,’ as it was then termed – often 
the children of mixed marriages who, it should be emphasized, felt very little kinship with the Jews of 
eastern Europe.”21 Jews thought things could not get worse for them, but new laws were passed that 
further restricted their rights, such as allowing local executives to intern foreign Jews, removing Jews 
from military positions, and forbidding Jews to hold professional positions, including in law and 
medicine, and from studying at university.22 By the summer of 1942, mass roundups and deportations of 
Jews in France were beginning.  
The planning for these roundups began seriously at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942. It 
was here that the Germans decided on the Final Solution and declared they would receive 11 million 
Jews from across Europe, with 260-280,000 from France’s Unoccupied Zone and 180,000 in the 
Occupied zone. 23  In the minutes of the Conference, the details for the Final Solution were recorded, 
                                                          
19 Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, xii. 
20 Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 3-7; Samuel, Rescuing the Children, 20. 
21 Samuel, Rescuing the Children, 20. 
22 Marrus and Paxton,  Vichy France and the Jews, 13, 75, 98. 
23 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 83 -84. 
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The pattern of the Final Solution of the problem should be the transfer of all Jews, under a 
reliable escort, to the East where they are to be attached to the Labor Service….It goes without 
saying that a large proportion will quite naturally be eliminated by their physical unfitness at the 
beginning. The survivors at the end of the work project, who will also be the strongest among 
them, will have to be given suitable treatment at the conclusion of the operation.24  
 
This clearly lays out the Nazis’ plan to murder the European Jews, including those in France.  It was this 
goal that the Germans were striving for when Rene Bousquet, Secretary of State for the Vichy Police and 
chief organizer of the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup, agreed with the SS to deliver 32,000 foreign Jews to avoid the 
arrest of French Jews.25  
The Vel’ ‘Hiv Roundup 
In order to meet the quota, German and French officials planned the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup. The 
plan was for French police officers to arrest 27,388 foreign Jews (from Germany, Austria, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union) living in Paris and the surrounding suburbs based on the index 
cards made for these Jews from the mandatory census in 1940.26  The arrests included men and women, 
and based on the recommendation of Pierre Laval (the new Vichy President) to ensure the quota was 
met and to avoid the problem of what to do with the children whose parents were arrested, children 
were also arrested.27 When the head of the Gestapo’s anti-Jewish section in France, Theodor Dannecker, 
learned of Laval’s request, he sent the following message to Adolf Eichmann, the SS leader of the Jewish 
Department in Germany, “President Laval has proposed that, when it comes to the deportation of 
Jewish families from the non-occupied zone, children under sixteen be taken too. As for the Jewish 
children who would remain in the occupied zone, the question does not interest him.”28 Not 
unsurprisingly, Eichmann approved this request.  
                                                          
24 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 83 -84. 
25 Caroline Wiedmer, The Claims of Memory: Representations of the Holocaust in Contemporary Germany 
and France (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 40; Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 86. 
26 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 3; Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 105. 
27 Wiedmer, The Claims of Memory, 41. 
28 Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auschwitz:le role de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive en France, 
1942 (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 237, quoted in Wiedmer, The Claims of Memory, 41. 
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The only people who were excluded from arrest were women over 55, men over 60, women 
about to give birth or with children under two, wives of prisoners of war, and a few other groups that 
would not be targeted until later roundups.29 In theory, Jewish children born in France should not have 
been arrested, but they were taken anyway. Until July 1942, except for a few exceptions, only men were 
arrested and sent to the work and internment camps, however, the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup was the start of 
large scale roundups that did not differentiate based on youth or sex. 30  On the morning of Tuesday, July 
16, 1942, about 4,500 French policemen went out in on average teams of two or three to arrest 27,388 
foreign Jews with some of the following instructions:  
As soon as the identity of a listed Jew has been confirmed, inspectors and guards are to proceed 
with the arrest, taking no notice of any protest or argument the prisoner may offer.  
Every Jew listed is to be brought to the preliminary collecting center, no notice being taken of 
the state of health of the prisoners or exceptions made for that reason. 
Guards and inspectors are responsible for the success of the operation, which must be carried 
out with the maximum speed and without useless conversation or argument.  
Children living with the person or persons arrested shall be taken away with them, and no 
member of the family shall remain in the apartment. Nor are children to be left with neighbors. 
Where an individual named on the list has not been arrested, guards and inspectors are to give 
the reasons for the failure, keeping their report brief and to the point.31 
In addition to these instructions, the police were told to have Jews bring their identification and ration 
cards, food and clothing for at least two days, along with two blankets and basic kitchen utensils. Each 
person was only allowed two suitcases and police had to make sure the electricity, gas, and water were 
turned off, keys were left with the concierge or a neighbor, and pets were left with the concierge.32  The 
                                                          
29 Paris Prefecture of Police, “Consignes pour les equips charges des arrestations,” July 12, 1942 and 
“Secret circulaire no. 173-42,” July 13, 1942, reprinted in Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auschwitz, 248-56, quoted in Zuccotti, 
The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 105.  
30 The first large roundup occurred between May 9 and May 14, 1941 when 3,747 foreign men (aged 18-
60) received orders to report to a certain location, where they were arrested and sent to Pithiviers and Beaune-la-
Rolande.; Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 81-83. 
31 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 10-11. 
32 Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 105. 
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fact that those arresting them were French and in French uniform comforted the Jews, not believing 
that anything seriously bad was happening. Additionally, no one suspected that women and children 
would be sent to a work camp, let alone Auschwitz, as up until this point only men had been arrested 
and taken to labor camps.  
Once the Jews were arrested, they were taken to local checkpoints for processing at schools, 
police stations, and gymnasiums, and then adults without children were sent to Drancy (a holding 
ground until deportation) and those with children were sent to the Velodrome d’Hiver, known as the 
Vel’ d’Hiv (a sports stadium for indoor cycling and racing).33 Mrs. Rado noted the change in the 
policemen after they arrived at the collection centers. She said, "As soon as we had all got onto the bus, 
a police officer shouted to the driver and the policemen accompanying us-though the message was 
intended mainly for us-'If anyone so much as moves or tries to escape, use your guns.' That made me 
shiver. Being a woman with three small children, I was scared.”34 It was at this point, when after the 
Jews were processed and then sent to either the Vel’ d’Hiv or Drancy, when they realized the 
seriousness of their situation. 
The police handled and performed this job with varying levels of enthusiasm. Some policemen 
were clearly upset about the task at hand, and others attempted to warn Jews about the roundup and 
provided opportunities for Jews to escape. Annie Kriegal, 15, was walking home on Tuesday morning 
and saw “a policeman in uniform who was carrying a suitcase in each hand and crying. I distinctly 
remember those tears running down a rugged, rather reddish face because you would agree that you do 
not often see a policeman cry in public. He was going down the street followed by a little indistinct flock, 
children and old people mixed together carrying bundles.”35 Other officers gave people a 15 minute to 
an hour warning, saying that they would come back in an hour to arrest them, and to take this time to 
                                                          
33 Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 105. 
34 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 40. 
35 Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 104. 
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prepare, giving them the opportunity to escape.36 One boy remembered a policeman hinted to his 
mother, Mrs. Soral, that she should escape, telling her to go buy food but “don’t go too far. I’ll wait for 
you here by your things.”37 Mrs. Soral bought some food and returned with her three children to the 
police officer. Even with the goodwill from police officers allowing some a chance to escape, there were 
few options of escape or hiding for foreign Jews living in Paris in areas teeming with policemen, 
especially for women with children.  
Similar to a few of the sympathetic police officers, others involved in the roundup offered some 
help to the Jews. For example, concierge Marie Chotel woke seven year old Odette Meyers and her 
mother at 5AM warning them that the police were coming. They hid in Marie’s broom closet while she 
entertained the police officers with wine and anti-Semitic comments. Afterwards, her husband Henri 
took Odette to stay with a Catholic family in a small village outside of Paris where she hid for the 
remainder of the war.38 In addition to concierges and the police, bureaucrats and office workers who 
were involved in the planning and preparation of the roundup alerted friends and family that a roundup 
was coming and to flee or hide. Some slipped warnings into mailboxes and a warning was published and 
in two clandestine newspapers. Many people did not heed these warnings because they did not believe 
the rumors, could not understand the seriousness of the situation, or only hid if they were men because 
they did not believe that women and children would be included.39  Maurice Rajsfus said that his parents 
had heard rumors of a roundup, but that “so many false warnings had already reached us that we did 
not attach the necessary importance [to this one].”40 But instead of anticipating the horror of the Vel’ 
d’Hiv and eventual deportation to Auschwitz, they believed they would simply be interned for the rest of 
                                                          
36 Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 106. 
37 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 35. 
38 Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 106-107. 
39 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 16;  Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 108. 
40 Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 108. 
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the war outside of Paris like other male family members had been.41 
While the Jews who were aided by police officers, shop owners, neighbors, and resistance 
workers appreciated this kindness, French and German officials thought otherwise. In a memo to 
Knochen and Oberg on July 18, 1942, Roethke criticized the French police for allowing some officers to 
help the Jews. He said, “There were many instances of French bystanders expressing pity for the Jews 
who were being arrested. They reacted particularly to the arrest of Jewish children. The transport of 
Jewish families was not effected with due efficiency in many cases, so that the non-Jewish population 
noticed, and people gathered into small crowds to talk about the event.”42 In addition to his complaints, 
Roethke made sure to mention that the transportation of the Jews was still on schedule and that they 
were working hard to get the information of the officers who warned Jews.43  
In contrast to those who tried to help or warn Jews, others took advantage of those who were 
arrested, turned Jews in hiding in to the authorities, and/or carried out their duties of arresting Jews 
zealously. Some policemen were angry when there was no answer at the doors they knocked on, and 
one said, "If we only had the necessary authorization, we would ferret out these Jews who think they 
can saddle themselves on us."44 Some policemen did so anyway, and broke down the doors of 
apartments when no one opened the door. One woman at home alone with her two young children was 
afraid to open the door when the police knocked early in the morning, for her husband had already 
been arrested and was held at Pithiviers to be deported to Auschwitz. When the police broke down the 
door she picked her children and jumped out of the five story high window, killing all three of them.45  
In addition to over-zealous police officers, regular citizens became informers who betrayed Jews 
in hiding. A report from an anonymous informer said the Vistuck family hid in a neighbor’s house, 
                                                          
41 Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 8. 
42 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 80-81. 
43 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 81. 
44 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 26-27. 
45 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 27. 
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probably giving the neighbors their milk coupons in exchange for letting their family stay. The report 
said, “Most Jews hid in their neighbors’ houses, though some went considerable distances from their 
homes. The Vistuks, for example, who live at 76 Rue de Bondy, were not at home when the police called 
for them. Yet after their disappearance their milk ration continues to be collected from the diary on the 
ground floor of the building, where they are registered. The fact that their supply of milk is fetched for 
them by a Frenchwoman suggests that they must be hiding nearby.”46 Reports like these show how 
there were people who were actively collaborating with Germany and Vichy helping them to achieve 
their anti-Semitic goals of expelling Jews out of France.   
Despite the kindness of some and the callousness of others, the majority of policemen and 
French civilians were indifferent towards these roundups, exhibiting the attentisme “wait-and-see” 
attitude.  No policemen refused to arrest the Jews and only one, possibly two, resigned afterwards as a 
result of the roundup.47  Instead, according to Levy and Tillard, the police carried out their duties with 
“complacent calm,” had “good behavior,” and were “confidence-inspiring” to the Jews who were being 
arrested.48  It was more common for the police to be stoic and methodologically work their way through 
the arrests they had to make. A nurse talking to the guards outside the gymnasium at Japy said, "Almost 
all of them said that they would never have joined the mobile guard if they had known they would be 
given this kind of duty. They admitted that their orders to were shoot if necessary."49 Even though many 
of the policemen and other workers instrumental for the operation, claimed they did not want to do 
those jobs, they did so anyway with little to no dissent. It was this attentisme attitude, this apathy, 
which allowed the roundup to happen and for almost 13,000 innocent Jews to be arrested and 
deported.   
                                                          
46 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 82. 
47 Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 106. 
48 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 32. 
49 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 40. 
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In the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup there were clearly those who actively aided Jews, those who actively 
collaborated with the Germans and Vichy, and those who simply did nothing and observed what went 
on. Many Jews encountered people who fell into all three of these categories throughout the roundup. 
Nine year old Annette Muller’s story shows the clear variety of reactions to the roundups. The 
policeman who arrested her family allowed her to buy a comb when she could not find hers, and a 
shopkeeper tried to get her to escape. However, passersby expressed approval of the roundup, and her 
concierge pillaged their apartment after they were arrested.50 In addition, on esurvivor said that as they 
were walking through the streets after being arrested, “people stared at us, but I could not make out 
what they were thinking. Their faces seemed blank and indifferent. At Place Voltaire there was a small 
crowd, and one woman started shouting: 'I'm glad! I'm glad! Let them all go to the devil!' But she was 
the only one. The children clung to me tighter. As we passed the group, a man turned to the woman 
who had shouted and said, 'It'll be our turn next. Poor things.' She blushed and walked away. The 
policemen told us to walk faster."51 Parisians had a wide range of reactions to the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup, 
but overall there was a prevailing distaste for it, as this was the first time there was a mass roundup 
including women and children that, despite Vichy’s and Germany’s efforts, was visible to the public.  
At the end of the two day roundup, 3,031 men, 5,802 women, and 4,051 children, totaling 
12,884 Jews, were arrested and held as prisoners in Drancy or the Vel’ d’Hiv.52 Due to the kindness of 
those who spread the word about the roundup, hid or helped Jews flee, and those who remained silent 
and did not turn in the Jews in hiding, less than half of the Jews whose cards were pulled were actually 
arrested. The difference between the anticipated goal and reality is believed to represent those who 
went into hiding, fled, or committed suicide. Throughout the two-day roundup and the days that 
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followed, there were an estimated 106 suicides and 24 deaths from sickness or childbirth.53 However for 
the nearly 13,000 Jews, being arrested was only the beginning of a nightmarish one-to-four weeks with 
the end destination of Auschwitz.    
When the Jews with children arrived at the Vel’ d’Hiv, they were met with a space that could fill 
15,000 spectators, but that was ill equipped to house 7,000 for up to a week.54 Young and old alike were 
packed into the sports stadium, lying on hard bleachers or the floor. Eyewitnesses consistently report 
that there was hardly room to move and that people were being trodden underfoot.55 A doctor’s report 
tells of the horrible circumstances the victims were kept in, “It would take a whole book to record the 
heartbreaking sights I came across during my shifts at the Vel d’Hiv.” 56 A nurse told the doctor that he 
was not helping by providing medicine because “not only were the toilets inadequate, but by now they 
were blocked and absolutely unusable and furthermore could not be repaired.57 A Red Cross nurse also 
reported of the conditions at the Vel’ d’Hiv, "The atmosphere was stuffy and nauseating: nervous 
breakdowns, shouting, weeping of children and even of adults who were at the end of their ether. 
Several deranged individuals also spread panic. All was helter-skelter, it was impossible to sleep, there 
were not mattresses, and people were piled one on top of the other."58 The conditions at the Vel’ d’Hiv 
were far from humane, and provided a glimpse into the similarly bad situation at Drancy and other 
camps across France and Europe.59  
In addition to the lack of sanitation and inability of basic needs being met at the Vel’ d’Hiv, the 
general mood was that of despair and hopelessness, with few managing to escape.  During the week, 
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there were 30 attempted suicides (ten were successful), and the most common method was by 
individuals throwing themselves over the tiers of the arena.60 This affected some of the French police 
guarding the entrances, with accounts reporting some guards were weeping, but that in general they 
were “icy and indifferent” according to Dr. Vilenski, one of the few medical practitioners to be allowed 
entrance into the Vel’ d’Hiv.61 A few very lucky and determined individuals were able to escape from the 
Vel’ d’Hiv during confusion at the entrances and exits, that were only possible because of a lack of 
organization and the occasional benevolence of a guard. For example, 14 year old Louis Pitkowitz 
slipped out while a group of angry mothers were arguing with the guards.62  
To help combat the general despair and unbearable conditions within the Vel’ d’Hiv, there were 
various groups who tried to help the victims as best as they could, including the Quakers, school groups, 
teachers, the Red Cross, and the UGIF (l'Union Generale des Israelites de France), an organization set up 
by the Germans and Vichy as the state recognized Jewish representative organization.63 Throughout the 
course of the week, no more than 15 nurses, doctors, and social workers were allowed into the Vel’ 
d’Hiv, and only a couple were allowed in at a time. Even though the members of the UGIF knew the 
roundup was coming and talked about it at a meeting on July 14th, they decided they were powerless to 
stop it and resigned themselves to simply offering medical aid to those held at the Vel’ d’Hiv. The UGIF 
was a Jewish organization that tried to help Jews who were being targeted by the government, but in 
actuality was used by the Germans and Vichy to help them attain their goals of arresting and eradicating 
the Jews in France.64 This shows how even some resistance groups allowed events to happen and simply 
tried to mitigate the effects of German and Vichy policy, acting at times more like those with the 
attentisme attitude than resisters, showing how complex it was for those trying to decide how to react 
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to the situation in France.   
Within three to seven days of being arrested, those at the Vel’ d’Hiv were transferred to 
Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande and the work of the resisters to get the children out and to safety 
became the biggest focus.65 There were some individual efforts and some by organized groups and 
networks who tried to work to get the children released, and then hide them with families in France or 
smuggle them into Switzerland or Spain.66 Similar operations were going on elsewhere in France by 
various organizations, such as the OSE. Vivette Samuel worked with others to save 427 children from the 
Unoccupied Zone from deportation from Riversaltes, and about 100 children from Venissieux in the 
same summer.67 However, most of the children from the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup were not as lucky, and the 
few that were released and put into the homes run by the UGIF, while well taken care of, were 
eventually all deported anyway.68 Even though many had good intentions, it was not enough to save the 
children of the Vel’ d’Hiv. 
  On July 31, the children at Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande were separated from their parents 
because even though Germany had granted Laval’s request to arrest children, officials had not yet 
approved their deportation (although no one saw that it would be an issue, they were simply waiting for 
the go ahead from Eichmann).69 Nine year old Annette Muller Bessmann described what happened, 
"The children hung on to their mothers, pulling on their dresses. They had to separate us with rifle butts, 
with truncheons, with streams of icy water. It was a savage scramble, with cries, tears, howlings of grief. 
The gendarmes tore the women's clothing, still looking for jewels or money. Then suddenly, a great 
silence. On one side, hundreds of young children, on the other the mothers and older children. In the 
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middle, the gendarmes giving curt orders."70  These gendarmes took their duties to the extreme, by not 
only guarding the interned Jews, but also by being unnecessarily harsh and abusive to them. It was, and 
still is, hard for the French today to come to terms with the fact that it was French police and guards 
who were in charge of the roundups and deportations until they reached the German border.  After this 
separation of parents from children, the mass deportations of those held in the Vel’ d’Hiv to Auschwitz 
began, starting with the adults. 
By August 8th, nine trains had taken 9,000 mostly foreign Jews from France to Auschwitz. Left 
behind were 3,500 children, a handful of mothers and some Red Cross volunteers. The sanitary 
conditions were still terrible, with only a few buckets for lavatories in the barracks, and most of the 
children had diarrhea and the attendants could not keep the children nor their single pair of clothes 
clean. About half were infants and did not know their own names, which contradicted the official claim 
that the children were simply being sent east to be reunited with their families.71  The French finally 
received permission to deport the children to Drancy in early August.72 Annette Monod Lewis was a Red 
Cross worker who recalled that "They [the children] didn't understand what was expected of them, and 
some even wandered off from the group.”73 As many didn’t know their names roll call was impossible. 
Monod continued, “Finally they were ordered to take the children to the railroad station nearby and not 
bother with the roll call, as long as the required number of children were put on the train."74 This 
deportation of children strikes a chord with many people because of the clear innocence of the children 
and their inability to protect themselves, which is why the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup became a symbol for 
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Vichy’s and France’s crimes against humanity, and a rallying cry for recognition of France’s role in the 
Holocaust after the war.  
Three days after the children arrived in Drancy they followed their parents to ‘Pitchipoi,’ which 
one child named the mysterious destination.75 French guards searched their bundles and took any 
jewelry they had left, in some cases ripping earrings from the girls’ ears if it took too long for them to 
take them off.76 Between August 17th and 31st, seven trains left with 1,000 passengers each. Some one 
third to one half of them were unaccompanied children from the Vel’ d’Hiv, with one to ten adults in 
each car. They were packed in cattle cars with no food, no water, and a couple buckets for a lavatory. 
The stench and exposure to the elements was unbearable. Albert Tselnick said that people exclaimed: 
“This can’t go on! They will have to stop the train. We will be allowed into the clean air. Nothing can be 
worse than this.”77  There is no evidence recording how many children died on the way to Auschwitz or 
how they were unloaded, but no child who was deported to Auschwitz ever returned to France.78  From 
July 18 to the beginning of August, including those rounded up on July 16 and 17, 14,579 men, women, 
and children from France were deported to Auschwitz, and only about 50 returned. 79 
 As the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundups led to the deportation of only about 13,000 Jews out of the agreed 
upon 32,000, the Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, Darquier de Pellepoix wrote a letter to Pierre Laval on 
July 23,1942 saying the following:  
I take the liberty of proposing the following supplementary measures: 1. The arrest of all alien 
Jews…who have fled into the unoccupied zone, holding them in readiness for transportation. 2. 
Since the Germans do not object, one could equally arrest…all foreign Jews not possessing 
passports issued recently and clearly valid. 3. If….the agreed total of 32,000 has not been 
reached, it might be advisable to make up that number by arresting Jews of French nationality 
whose naturalization does not date back further than January 1, 1927. I would like to stress that 
these absolutely essential measures are to be applied immediately in order to fulfill the promise 
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made by the French government to the German authorities.80 
This letter shows how Vichy was working very closely with Germany and had many shared goals. Instead 
of simply carrying out the measures Germany ordered, Vichy officials went a step further and actually 
created their own policies in order to meet German demands, as shown in the above letter and in 
Laval’s idea to arrest and deport children as well as adults. The concern to fill the trains provided by the 
Germans to transport the Jews from Drancy to Auschwitz led Vichy to fill the remaining spaces by 
deporting Jews in the Unoccupied Zone, as well as handing over those already in concentration camps to 
the Germans and holding new raids to refill the camps.81 Vichy went above and beyond simple 
collaboration by obeying Germany’s orders, but instead thought of their own ways to rid France of its 
Jews. 
 Additionally, Vichy’s position of collaboration was endorsed, or at the least not challenged, by 
the Vatican, whose indifference and apathy allowed Vichy’s collaboration to go unchecked by the 
Church. Petain asked Leon Berand, the ambassador to the Vatican to find out what Pope Pius XII thought 
of Vichy’s anti-Semitic legislation. On September 2, 1942 Berand reported that “nothing was ever said at 
the Vatican which might suggest that the Holy See felt any criticism or disapproval of the laws and 
regulations in question....I have it from a reliable source that the Vatican will pick no quarrel with you 
over the statute of the Jews."82 Vichy knew that it would be unchallenged by the Vatican, who while not 
actively collaborating, allowed Vichy to continue its anti-Semitic policies and roundup and deportation 
of Jews. According to Daniel Goldhagen, Catholic doctrine even provided justification for the Holocaust, 
specifically in targeting Jews, based on centuries of anti-Semitic church teachings that Jews were the 
tainted murderers of Christ.83 It was because of this anti-Semitism entrenched in traditional Catholic 
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doctrine that “The Church, Pius XII, and bishops and priests across Europe reckoned morally during the 
Nazi period and, by and large, decided that allowing or abetting the Germans’ and their helpers’ 
persecution of the Jews and even letting the Jews die was preferable to intervening on their behalf.”84 
Therefore, institutions normally considered moral compasses played a role in the Holocaust by both 
setting the stage for discriminatory and hateful behavior as well as failing to come to the defense of the 
Jews when it was clear something needed to be done.   
 People actively collaborated, simply went along with Vichy, and allowed these events to happen 
for a variety of reasons. Those who actively collaborated often agreed with the Nazis’ anti-Semitic 
beliefs and/or wanted to set France up with who they presumed would reign victorious at the end of the 
war. Others said they simply wanted to get through the war and not cause trouble, but it is often 
difficult to uncover people’s true motivations, especially if those motivations contradict with what is 
considered morally or ethically right. In Vivette Samuel’s memoir, she talked about a French captain who 
talked to her about de Gaulle, saying “It’s all a lot of nonsense. Me, I’m a reservist anyway. All I want is 
to get back to my business in Paris. Me, I’ve got a family to feed…he’s a crackpot, that de Gaulle, you 
mark my words.”85 However, for Samuel, de Gaulle gave her hope and inspired her to join the 
resistance, showing that people reacted to these events widely differently from each other.86  
 Serge Netchine, who was 18 at the time of the German occupation, recollected the importance 
of those who decided against collaboration or apathy. He said, “Without Vichy’s collaboration, the Nazis 
would not have been able to exterminate so many Jews living in France, but without the help – visible or 
invisible – of the people around us, few Jews could have survived.”87 It was those who were deliberately 
going against Vichy and Germany who helped save Jews, which while not including the Vatican, did 
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include some churches and priests. A pastoral letter read in churches, written by Jules-Gerard Saliege, 
the Archbishop of Toulouse, rallied Christians to stand up and help the Jews. It said, "Jews are men and 
women. Foreigners are men and women. It is just as criminal to use violence against these men and 
women, these fathers and mothers with families, as it is against anyone else. They too are members of 
the human race. They are our brothers like so many others. A Christian cannot forget that."88 Some 
priests were actively involved in hiding Jewish children and refused to give them up, even though the 
French government arrested them if they declined to do so. In a cable from Ambassador Bergen to 
Berlin on September 14, 1942, he said "The French government has ordered the arrest of all priests who 
hide Jews wanted for deportation, or help them escape deportation by any means whatever. Several 
priests from the Lyon diocese have already been taken into custody, some because they supported and 
spread the message of protest spoken by their archbishop and others because they refused to give up 
the Jewish children in their care."89 The refusal of these priests to collaborate with Vichy and give up the 
children to be inevitably deported demonstrated that among resistors and the many apathetic French, 
there were people who were passionate and dedicated to standing their ground and aiding the Jews in 
need. 
 Similar to collaborators, resisters had different reasons for joining the fight, either militarily, 
working for clandestine newspapers, or in aiding the Jews in other ways. Danielle Bailly, who during the 
German occupation was separated from her parents and was hidden and protected by strangers, said in 
the introduction to Hidden Children of France, “We [the hidden children] are here because of those who 
– spontaneously or after reflection, willingly or somewhat reluctantly, paid or unpaid – refused to accept 
Nazi barbarianism and the complicity of zealous collaboration.”90 The Jews in France relied on the 
kindness of strangers, friends, and neighbors to survive, enabling 75 percent of the Jews living in France 
                                                          
88 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 188. 
89 Levy and Tillard, Betrayal at the Vel’ d’Hiv, 142. 
90 Bailly, ed, The Hidden Children of France, xix. 
21
Munday: The Vel' d'Hiv Roundup
Published by ScholarWorks@GVSU, 2015
22 
 
to be saved from deportation.  
 This demonstrates the importance of those who did not cooperate with Vichy, but also shows 
how the apathetic and indifferent section of the population, while they were instrumental in allowing 
the Holocaust in France to occur, were also instrumental in allowing the majority of the Jews in France 
to survive the war. This is why those with the attentisme attitude should not be immediately lumped 
with the collaborators, nor with the resisters, because there were a variety of people who did nothing 
for a variety of reasons. Trying to uncover what the majority of the population thought, especially when 
what they thought may or may not have correlated with their actions, provides a historical challenge.  
Public Memory 
 While during and after the war many feigned ignorance about what was going on with the 
roundups and deportations, the reality was that people knew about as much as they wanted to, 
especially towards the end of the war when the deportations to the east dramatically increased. News 
of the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup spread quickly through pamphlets, eyewitness accounts broadcast on the 
BBC, and through conversations on the streets. Even though these stories were sometimes exaggerated 
and contained many falsehoods and omissions, the basic information of the roundups and France’s role 
in them made its way to most French households within a month.91 Even so, most people did not believe 
the rumors of gas chambers and deliberate mass killings that occurred in the east, thinking that it was 
enemy propaganda or just impossible.92 They did not want to believe that something that horrible was 
happening and that their government and possibly the citizens themselves had allowed it to occur. Even 
the people who were apathetic and had an attentisme attitude still made a choice, conscious or 
unconscious, to react in a certain way to Vichy, the roundups, and deportations. While those who chose 
to do nothing and to continue living as if this was not happening cannot necessarily be lumped with 
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those who collaborated along with Vichy, they still allowed these events to happen and for thousands of 
innocent Jews residing in France to die.  
 After the war, many French expressed sympathy to the Jewish victims of the roundup as well as 
shock that France could have participated in such an event, which was especially true of large 
organizations and political leaders. However, the true test lay in how people reacted in the moment, 
when they had to choose how to act towards Vichy and the Jews in light of the roundup.93  Additionally, 
some collaborators said that they were simply practicing a pre-emptive strategy by undertaking certain 
projects, such as anti-Semitic legislation and roundups in the Occupied areas. At Xavier Vallat’s (the first 
commissioner-general for Jewish affairs) trial in 1947, Andre Lavagne (former chief of Petain’s civilian 
staff) said that the Statut des juifs was enacted as a “lighting small fires to save the forest.”94 Even if this 
was a legitimate reason why people collaborated, it would only make sense for Vichy to conduct 
roundups and other anti-Semitic policies in the Unoccupied Zone if they believed that Germany had 
intentions of extending their policies there, which at the beginning of the war was not a reasonable 
assumption.95  While it is difficult to see what motivated officials and average French citizens to react in 
different ways to the Holocaust and the German occupation, if one looks at the historical record left 
behind in policies and documents, it is clear that there were many enthusiastic collaborators, especially 
in influential positions in the Vichy regime, who made the deportations and roundups possible. 
 Similar to the changing public opinion and memory of Vichy and the Holocaust in France found 
in important scholarship described earlier, the way the French people and government have 
remembered and commemorated the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup has gone through many different transitions. 
Overall, the general move was from commemorative plaques and memorials that contained critical 
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historical inaccuracies and omissions (typically about the French involvement in the roundups, the 
amount of women and children arrested and deported, and the conditions in the Vel’ d’Hiv) towards a 
more accurate portrayal of the roundup and recognition of France’s collaboration, at least on an 
institutional level, and role in the roundup.  
 The first plaque, created in 1949 under de Gaulle, was displayed outside of where the Vel’ d’Hiv 
used to stand (it was destroyed shortly after the war) and said the following:  
On July 16, 1942, 
thirty thousand  
Jewish men, women and children 
 victims of racial persecution  
were confined in this place by order of the Nazi occupier,  
all separated from each other, 
they were deported to Germany and the concentration camps. 
Free men, remember.96 
This plaque neglected to provide the correct dates of the roundup, not including the 17th, and omitted 
the amount of Jews who were both rounded up and held at the Vel’ d’Hiv. Most significantly, it placed 
all of the blame of the roundup on the Nazis, supporting the Gaullist myth that France was a nation of 
resisters with few collaborators. A more recent plaque, erected in 1986 by Jacques Chirac (then-mayor 
of Paris) tells a slightly more detailed and accurate tale. 
On July 16 and 17, 1942 
Thirteen thousand one hundred and fifty-two Jews were arrested 
 in Paris and its suburbs  
deported and assassinated at Auschwitz 
In the Velodrome d’Hiver, which stood here, 
Four thousand one hundred and fifteen children 
Two thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine women 
One thousand one hundred and twenty-nine men 
were confined under unhuman conditions, 
by the police of the Vichy government, 
on the order of the Nazi occupiers. 
May those who tried to come to their aid be thanked. 
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Passer-by remember! 
May they rest in peace (in Hebrew)97 
The corrected historical details are evident, including the date and number of Jews arrested, however, 
the plaque still omits that the Jews who were arrested were foreign Jews, many of whom migrated to 
France to gain protection. In addition, the plaque makes no mention that it was a French idea to arrest 
and deport the children, misleading the reader to thinking France was simply acting on orders from 
Germany. Wiedmer commented that even though this second plaque contains more correct 
information, the fact that it presents incomplete facts as the whole truth detracts from its validity.98 The 
existence of inaccurate plaques is not unique to those at the site of the former Vel d’Hiv, but also 
occurred at other sites, such as at the Saint-Quen school, one of the collection centers during the 
roundup, where nearly 600 Jews were arrested by thirty-two policemen. A plaque placed at the school 
in 1965 stated that the Jews had been arrested by “German occupation troops” instead of the French 
police, showing how it was not uncommon for the French to neglect to address the extent to which 
France was involved in the deportations of Jews. 99 
 Public memory of the Vel d’Hiv Roundup can also been looked at through the changing 
commemorative ceremonies, transforming from being privately observed by various French Jewish 
organizations to a national commemorative ceremony.  In 1993, then-President Francois Mitterrand, 
after stirring up controversy over still observing the death of Petain, a long friendship with Bousquet, 
and reusing to acknowledge that France even needed to recognize its crimes during the Holocaust, 
officially dedicated July 16 to be the “National Day of Commemoration of the Racist and Anti-Semitic 
Persecutions Committed under the de facto Authority called ‘Government of the French State’ (1940-
1944).”  This was the first official recognition of French involvement in the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup.100 In 
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addition to commissioning a new plaque, Mitterrand also sponsored a competition for a 
commemorative statue to be placed in a more prominent and public location. However, this statue, 
consisting of four adults and two children spread out with their luggage misconstrues the percentage of 
children at the Vel’ d’Hiv and the cramped conditions.101 However, the shift from private to national 
commemoration of the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup broke the continuity between the France and Vichy who 
committed these acts and the current France, thus allowing people the opportunity to continue to place 
the blame of the events on others, either a previous government or a previous generation.102  
 The first national commemoration ceremony was observed on July 16, 1993 and was in stark 
contrast to the private services held in years past. The ceremony was attended by 2,000 invited 
individuals, and there were barriers to prevent any others from officially participating. Various 
organizations placed wreaths around the plaque at the site of the former Vel’ d’Hiv, there was a speech 
by the president of the Jewish organization CRIF (Representative Council of the Jewish Institutes of 
France), a recital of the kaddish, a couple speeches from survivors of the roundup, and a performance of 
two Yiddish songs from the daughter of a survivor. The Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur gave the 
keynote address, assuring the people that the current government was fighting racism. The ceremony 
ended with two songs (Le Chant des Marais and La Marseillaise), which typically would include the 
audience singing along, but the speakers were so loud that the people stopped and just listened to the 
choir.103  
 Many of the survivors and participants in the old ceremonies commented that the ceremony 
was well done, but that it was insensitive to their wishes and desires for remembering and mourning. 
One survivor said “I preferred it before. It was just us….there weren’t all of these barriers to channel the 
                                                          
101 Wiedmer, The Claims of Memory, 47-49. 
102 Booth, “Communities of Memory, 253. 
103 Wiedmer, The Claims of Memory 51-52.  
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people. Barriers, here, they don’t realize what that reminds us of.”104 While many agreed that it was 
right and necessary for France to officially recognize their part in the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup, there has been 
some criticism for the way they went about it and about whether or not the French government and 
people have accepted their different roles in the Holocaust in France, and what that means for the 
present and future France and French Jews.  
 The events of the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup, the arrest, deportation, and death of almost 13,000 
innocent foreign Jews in France are engrained in France’s history, and is prominent today in public 
memory of the Holocaust in France. However, even though there has been increased discussion, 
apology, and commemoration of France’s role in these events, there is still a reluctance to personally 
take the burden of responsibility for France’s actions, in a desire to separate oneself from these crimes 
against humanity.  The Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup and deportations provide an example of how a government 
and a people can collaborate with an occupying power by both obeying orders and also actively 
introducing their own racist and unjust policies. It also demonstrates the importance of having a 
population comprised of people who will stand against injustices they see committed by fellow citizens 
and their government, and to understand that the smallest of helpful acts can do immeasurable good in 
the lives of others. But this event can also be seen as a warning to those who do not actively collaborate 
or actively resist oppressive regimes and policies; that the way they react or do not react in these 
situations can either increase the amount of evil done or increase the amount of good and prevent 
further atrocities. If anything, the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup shows that everyone has a choice to make in terms 
of where they stand. It is clear what humanity is capable of if people allow injustices to occur, but it is 
also clear that thousands of lives can be saved and lots of good done with relatively simply acts of 
kindness and goodwill.  
                                                          
104 Nathaniel Herzberg, “Vel’ d’Hiv’: la Republique retrouve la memoire,” in Liberation, July 17, 1993, 17, 
quoted in Wiedmer, The Claims of Memory, 52. 
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